By Arman Shariati
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), in a statement on Monday, said it has captured two more American MQM-170 reconnaissance drones over waters south of Qeshm Island, bringing the total number of such drones seized in recent days to four.
The drones were brought down using advanced electronic warfare systems, highlighting the growing role of electronic warfare capabilities in Iran’s efforts to counter aerial surveillance.
Before that, on October 30 and again on October 31, the IRGC Navy said it had intercepted and seized two American MQM-170 drones over Iranian territory.
Using the electronic warfare (EW), they successfully detected and identified a US military reconnaissance and decoy drone west of the Strait of Hormuz before taking control of its guidance and control systems.
Photographs released alongside the announcement showed the drone's airframe largely undamaged, with a specialist beginning to dismantle it to retrieve and examine its onboard data.
What the MQM-170 is and why the Pentagon values it
The drone in question is the MQM-170C “Outlaw G2,” manufactured by Griffon Aerospace, a US company specializing in unmanned target aircraft.
It is an upgraded version of the Outlaw G1 and was designed primarily to simulate aerial threats, allowing military crews to train against realistic targets without putting manned aircraft at risk.
Its primary role is that of an aerial target, replicating the visual or radar signatures of cruise missiles and hostile drones so that air defense units can engage it and assess their readiness and capabilities.
According to the manufacturer's published specifications, the aircraft is approximately 3.3 meters long, has a wingspan of around 4.9 meters, can remain airborne for up to eight hours, and operates at altitudes exceeding 16,000 feet.
What sets the Outlaw G2 apart from conventional target drones, however, is its ability to carry payloads. The MQM-170 family can be equipped with cameras, sensors, and other electronic systems, potentially transforming a training platform into an intelligence-gathering asset.
US military procurement records lend further weight to this possibility. In June, the Pentagon awarded a contract worth approximately $68 million for the third generation of the drone.
Significantly, the initial contract announcement explicitly mentioned its use in support of offensive operations against Iran.
This reference is noteworthy, as it suggests that the aircraft is part of a broader US military planning framework directly linked to operations against the Islamic Republic.
Why a target drone is flown toward an enemy’s coast
To understand why such an aircraft might be sent along Iran’s coastline, it is important to understand how modern air defense networks reveal their capabilities.
Integrated air defense systems are not built around individual weapons; rather, they comprise interconnected networks of radars, command posts, surface-to-air missile launchers, electronic warfare systems, and communications links.
Many of these components are designed to remain inactive or emit as little as possible until they are needed. A radar that is switched off, for example, cannot be detected through conventional surveillance.
Similarly, passive sensors may remain difficult to locate unless they are activated or engaged.
Given Iran’s emphasis on passive air defense capabilities, US planners may therefore seek to prompt these systems to reveal themselves.
By monitoring their responses, they can potentially identify and map their locations, operating patterns, and capabilities.
A target drone can serve this purpose effectively. By flying a route along the coast that mimics the flight profile of a hostile aircraft or cruise missile, it can prompt the defending force to activate its sensors and bring its weapons systems onto alert.
This technique is commonly described as probing or stimulating an air defense network.
The objective is to determine which radars activate under particular conditions, how tracking information is shared between systems, how long it takes for a potential threat to move from detection to engagement, and which components rely on one another for targeting and fire control.
Even if the drone itself gathers little intelligence, the responses it triggers can be extremely valuable.
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms operating nearby can monitor these reactions, record electronic emissions, identify transmitting sites, and help reconstruct the network’s operating logic.
The resulting picture can reveal active defense sites, operational bottlenecks, and the overall readiness of the defensive structure – information that military planners regard as essential when preparing for a major operation.
This helps explain why the drone’s presence may have alarmed Tehran. A reconnaissance flight of this kind is not necessarily an isolated provocation; it can form part of a broader preparatory effort to reduce the risks of future strikes by identifying where Iranian defenses are located and how they operate.
How an air defense force can defeat a drone without firing a missile
According to the IRGC’s account, Iran used electronic warfare rather than conventional weapons to counter the drone.
This approach can offer a less costly and less revealing alternative to firing a missile, while allowing a defending force to disrupt an aircraft without exposing the precise location of its units.
There are several ways electronic warfare can be used to disrupt or bring down a drone of this type. These methods can be employed individually or in combination, depending on the aircraft’s design and the electronic systems involved.
The first approach targets the command-and-control link between the drone and its operator. An aircraft of this class relies on a radio connection to receive instructions and transmit data to its ground station. If that connection is disrupted, the drone may follow one of two paths.
It may continue autonomously along a pre-programmed route, or it may activate a flight termination procedure, potentially resulting in a controlled landing or a crash.
Jamming can take different forms. Broadband jamming floods the frequencies used for communication with interference, while more targeted techniques seek to identify and disrupt the specific signals or protocols on which the aircraft relies.
Once the connection is lost, the operator may no longer be able to control the drone directly, leaving it to respond according to its onboard programming. Its subsequent behavior may therefore become difficult for its handlers to predict.
The second approach targets the satellite navigation systems that determine the drone’s position. Modern unmanned aircraft rely on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals for positioning, timing, and navigation, making interference with these signals potentially disruptive.
GPS jamming, for example, interferes with the frequencies used for navigation, preventing the aircraft from reliably determining its position. Depending on its design, the drone may respond by switching to an alternative navigation mode or activating a failsafe procedure.
GPS spoofing is more sophisticated. Instead of blocking genuine navigation signals, it uses counterfeit signals to mislead the aircraft about its location. In principle, this can cause a drone to follow an incorrect position estimate and deviate from its intended route.
Another technique, known as meaconing, involves receiving genuine signals and retransmitting them after a delay, potentially distorting the aircraft’s navigation calculations.
The regional dimension and the question of host states
The IRGC statement said the drone’s flight had “originated from the coast of one of the countries along the southern shore of the Persian Gulf,” without identifying the country.
That omission is significant. Several states along the southern Persian Gulf coast host American military forces, and any drone approaching Iran from that direction would likely have to operate from a location within the reach of Washington’s regional partners. The statement therefore appears to suggest that the aircraft was launched from the territory of a US ally.
The message seems directed at the Arab capitals of the Persian Gulf that host American forces: Tehran is signaling that it knows the drones conducting reconnaissance missions against Iran are operating from facilities on their territory.
The aircraft mapping Iranian air defenses is not necessarily taking off from a distant American base; it may be launched from an airfield just tens of kilometers from Iran’s coastline.
Iran’s apparent ability to monitor these flights and respond to them also carries a warning. The implication is that countries allowing US forces to use their territory for offensive operations against Iran could be held responsible for the consequences.
In other words, states hosting American military assets must consider not only their relationship with Washington but also the risks of living alongside an Iranian government that has demonstrated its willingness to respond to perceived threats.
A contest fought in the electromagnetic spectrum
The significance of the operation lies not only in the technology involved but also in the message it conveys. By relying on electronic warfare, Iran is signaling that it can challenge American reconnaissance without necessarily triggering a conventional missile exchange.
It is evidence that it can defend its airspace while limiting the exposure of its own capabilities.
The seizure of a relatively intact airframe could also provide Iranian engineers with an opportunity to examine the drone’s communications systems, onboard sensors, navigation equipment, and mission-planning capabilities.
Such information could help inform the development of electronic countermeasures and improve Iran’s understanding of how similar aircraft might be used in future operations.
The episode can also be viewed in the context of a recurring pattern in Washington’s assessments of Iran’s military capabilities. American planners have repeatedly underestimated the depth of Iran’s technical expertise, its organizational discipline, and its willingness to withstand pressure without responding on terms set by its adversaries.
Based on the information made public so far, the effort to gather intelligence on Iran’s air defenses along the Persian Gulf coast did not unfold as its planners had intended.
Iranian forces detected and identified the MQM-170 drones before disrupting their systems and taking control of the aircraft. This operation was a deliberate refusal to respond in the manner the reconnaissance mission was intended to provoke.
It remains unclear how much intelligence the drones collected or what information US monitoring platforms obtained from the Iranian response.
The use of electronic warfare rather than a missile interception may also have been intended to avoid the visible signatures associated with a conventional engagement.
A missile launch or other overt response could potentially reveal the positions and operating patterns of radars, launchers, and command systems to intelligence platforms monitoring the area. In that sense, the episode may illustrate an effort to deny an adversary the very information it was seeking to collect.
One of the most valuable things a military can reveal to an adversary is the timing and pattern of its responses. Restraint, therefore, can itself serve a defensive purpose.
Tehran has recognized the importance of controlling what its reactions reveal, and that dimension of the incident deserves attention.
As the United States continues its desperate attempts to gather intelligence and prepare for possible military contingencies, Iran is signaling that its forces remain alert to the prospect of another direct and full-scale military confrontation.
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