Examining Iran’s retaliatory options in event of US aggression against its power plants

By Yousef Ramazani

When US President Donald Trump threatened to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants, it triggered a detailed retaliatory blueprint from Tehran, one that would target not only the Israeli energy and information technology infrastructure but every power plant, desalination facility, and US-linked company across the Persian Gulf region.

The exchange of threats and warnings that has unfolded over the past 72 hours represents one of the most dangerous escalations in the ongoing US-Israeli war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran that began on February 28.

When Trump issued a 48-hour “ultimatum” demanding Iran open the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz to American tankers or face bombing of its power plants, the response from Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters was swift, detailed, and unequivocal.

Within hours, Tehran laid out a comprehensive retaliation matrix that would transform the strategic calculus of the war unfairly and illegally imposed on the Iranian people.

The warning was not abstract. It named specific categories of targets across the region – from the Israeli electric grid to desalination plants in the Persian Gulf – and specified the conditions under which they would be struck.

The subsequent American retreat from the ultimatum, announced on March 24, demonstrated that Iran’s deterrent posture had achieved its intended effect.

But the infrastructure vulnerabilities identified in Tehran’s warning remain, and they reveal a region whose critical assets are far more exposed than Western military planners have publicly acknowledged.

Anatomy of a possible retaliation

Iran’s retaliation doctrine, articulated in precise terms by the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the central command center of the Iranian armed forces, operates on a principle of proportional escalation with disproportionate consequences.

The warning issued on March 22, soon after Trump’s threat, established four distinct categories of targets that would be struck if American forces attacked Iranian power plants.

The first and most immediate response would be the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran would keep sealed to all traffic until its power plants are rebuilt, a process requiring months or years rather than weeks.

The second category includes all power plants, energy infrastructure, and information technology facilities belonging to the Israeli regime, which would be widely targeted in a coordinated campaign designed to dismantle the Zionist entity’s electrical grid and digital infrastructure.

The third and most strategically significant category targets all companies in the region that have American shareholders.

This provision transforms the war from a state-on-state confrontation into a direct attack on American commercial interests embedded throughout the Persian Gulf.

The fourth category names the power plants of countries hosting American military bases as legitimate targets.

Israeli vulnerable infrastructure

The Israeli power generation infrastructure, which has undergone a dramatic privatization over the past decade, presents a concentrated and exposed target set.

The Israel Electric Corporation operates 13 power stations with 42 generating units and an installed capacity of 9,474 megawatts, but the system’s resilience depends heavily on a handful of major facilities.

The Dalia power station near Kibbutz Kfar Menachem produces 912 megawatts, approximately 7 percent of overall demand, using combined cycle technology.

The Eshkol station in Ashdod, acquired by Dalia Energy in 2023, contributes an additional 1,606 megawatts. The Dorad station near Ashkelon adds 840 megawatts.

These three private facilities alone account for more than one-third of Israel’s total generating capacity, and their geographic concentration in the coastal plain makes them vulnerable to simultaneous strikes.

The Orot Rabin Power Plant is a coal-fired and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plant between the cities of Hadera and Caesarea, 35 km south of Haifa, made up of six thermal generation and two single-shaft combined-cycle units.

The CCGT power plant can run on dual-fuel, with natural gas as the primary fuel, and in case of its shortage, it can also run on fuel oil. In the last few years, there has been a gradual conversion from coal to gas.

The complex extends over 140 hectares and contains the Hadera Desalination Plant in the southern part, which supplies water to one million settlers, and a series of storage tanks in the northeast.

It is also the future hub for the under-construction multibillion-dollar Great Sea Interconnector project, the world's longest submarine power cable connecting it to Cypriot and Greek power grids, which is partly financed by the European Union.

Beyond power generation, its rapidly expanding data center sector represents a high-value target set with cascading consequences.

The Ofek data center in Ashdod, announced in February 2026, will provide 130 megawatts of information technology capacity with plans for expansion to 200 megawatts, making it the largest such facility planned in the occupied territories.

It is powered directly by the adjacent Eshkol Avshal power station, creating a concentrated infrastructure node whose destruction would disrupt not only electricity supply but cloud computing services, financial transactions, and the regime’s general operations.

A second major project at the IPM power plant in Be’er Tuvia, with 40 megawatts of IT capacity, represents a similar vulnerability.

The Israeli ambition to become a regional data center hub, supported by underwater fiber optic cables to Europe, has created a concentration of digital infrastructure that would be extraordinarily difficult to defend against a sustained missile campaign.

US shareholder web across the Persian Gulf

Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Iran’s retaliation doctrine is its targeting of American economic interests embedded within the infrastructure of neighboring states.

Across the Persian Gulf, a web of American corporate and financial participation binds the region’s critical assets to the United States in ways that transform commercial relationships into strategic liabilities.

Saudi Arabia’s Ras Al-Khair facility, one of the world’s largest integrated power and desalination plants, involves significant participation by American engineering firms, including General Electric and Fluor Corporation, with US financial institutions holding substantial stakes in the project companies.

The Shuaiba complex on the Red Sea coast presents a similar profile.

Both facilities, if targeted, would disrupt not only Saudi electricity and water supply but also the portfolios of American investors who have treated Persian Gulf infrastructure as a stable, long-term asset class.

The United Arab Emirates hosts two facilities of exceptional strategic importance. The Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the Arab world’s first commercial nuclear station, supplies approximately 25 percent of UAE electricity through its four reactors.

Westinghouse Electric Company, a major American nuclear engineering firm, provided reactor design and engineering support.

The Taweelah desalination plant, the world’s largest reverse osmosis facility, produces 909,000 cubic meters of water daily, enough for over 2 million people.

Its operating consortium includes American investment funds such as BlackRock and Global Infrastructure Partners.

A strike against Taweelah would not only deprive millions of drinking water but would also directly impact the portfolios of American institutional investors who hold stakes in the facility.

Kuwait’s Al-Zour complex, a massive integrated power and water facility, was financed in part by US financial institutions, including JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup. American investment funds hold minority stakes through infrastructure investment vehicles.

Qatar’s Umm Al Houl plant, combining 2,520 megawatts of power generation with 600,000 cubic meters of daily desalination capacity, involves American oil and gas service firms, including Halliburton and Schlumberger, with US investment funds maintaining positions in QatarEnergy-related securities.

Bahrain’s Al-Dur facility, with its 1,234-megawatt power plant and 218,000 cubic meters per day desalination capacity, was financed by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

Jordan’s Aqaba and Al-Samra thermal power stations have involved American contractors Bechtel and KBR.

The pattern is consistent across the region: critical infrastructure that Persian Gulf states depend upon for electricity, water, and digital connectivity has been financed, constructed, and partially owned by American corporations and financial institutions.

Iran’s retaliation doctrine explicitly targets this interdependence, turning American economic integration into a vulnerability rather than a source of strength.

Desalination dimension

One of the most devastating potential elements of Iran’s retaliation would be the targeting of desalination facilities across the Persian Gulf.

The region’s freshwater supply depends almost entirely on desalination, and the facilities that produce it are among the most sensitive and least resilient components of Persian Gulf infrastructure.

The Taweelah plant in the UAE, the Ras Al-Khair facility in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Zour complex in Kuwait, the Umm Al Houl plant in Qatar, and the Al-Dur facility in Bahrain collectively supply the majority of freshwater for a population of over 50 million people.

The Taweelah desalination plant, located in the UAE, is reportedly the largest reverse osmosis facility in operation in the world currently, with a capacity of 909,000 m³/day.

Unlike power plants, which can, in theory, be repaired or bypassed through grid interconnections, desalination facilities have no substitutes.

The destruction of even one major desalination plant would create a humanitarian crisis within days, and the simultaneous targeting of multiple facilities would overwhelm any conceivable emergency response.

Iran’s warning explicitly named water desalination facilities as legitimate targets in retaliation for strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, recognizing that the vulnerability of Persian Gulf freshwater supplies represents a strategic asymmetry that favors the defender.

Strait of Hormuz closure

The most immediate and economically consequential element of Iran’s retaliation would be the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Since the aggression began on February 28, Iran has maintained “intelligent control” over the waterway, allowing passage only to vessels not affiliated with the US-Israeli coalition or their supporters.

A complete closure would halt approximately 20 percent of globally traded oil that transits the strait daily, triggering an energy price shock that would reverberate through global markets within hours.

The economic consequences would fall disproportionately on the Persian Gulf states that depend on the strait for their oil exports and on the American and European economies that rely on Persian Gulf energy supplies.

Iran’s warning specified that the strait would remain closed until its destroyed power plants were rebuilt, a timeline measured in months or even years, not weeks.

This element of the retaliation doctrine transforms a tactical military strike into a strategic economic weapon with global implications.

American retreat: A calculated decision

The sequence of events from March 22 to March 24 demonstrates that Iran’s deterrent posture achieved its intended effect.

Trump’s threat to “obliterate” Iranian power plants, delivered on March 22, was met within hours by the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters’ detailed retaliation matrix.

By March 24, the American president had walked back his ultimatum, claiming that “very good and productive conversations” with Iran had led to a five-day postponement.

Iranian officials immediately rejected this claim. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf stated unequivocally that no negotiations had taken place, characterizing the American statements as “fake news” designed to manipulate oil markets. Iran’s foreign ministry also dismissed the US president’s claim in unequivocal terms.

The pattern reveals a familiar dynamic. When Trump had previously claimed ignorance of Israeli strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure in the third week of the war, Iranian retaliation against US-linked facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE followed swiftly.

The American retreat from the March 22 ultimatum suggests that the costs of attacking Iranian power plants – the destruction of American commercial interests across the region, the collapse of Persian Gulf freshwater supplies, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – were judged to outweigh any potential benefits.

Strategic implications

Iran’s retaliation doctrine represents a sophisticated evolution in asymmetric warfare, leveraging economic interdependence as a force multiplier.

By targeting not only Israeli infrastructure but American-owned assets embedded within Persian Gulf states, Tehran has created a deterrent that cannot be countered by military means alone.

The Persian Gulf states that host US bases and American shareholders now find themselves potential targets in an unnecessary war they did not choose, their critical infrastructure transformed into leverage against the United States.

For the United States, the vulnerability is equally profound. The web of American corporate and financial interests across the Persian Gulf – once celebrated as a source of regional influence – has become a strategic liability.

Investment funds, engineering firms, and financial institutions whose portfolios include Persian Gulf infrastructure now face the prospect of catastrophic losses in a war they cannot manage or control.

The American retreat from the March 22 ultimatum suggests that Washington recognizes this vulnerability, even if it cannot publicly acknowledge it.

As the war enters its fifth week, the infrastructure map of the region has become a battlefield in ways that military planners are only beginning to comprehend.

Iran’s retaliation doctrine, articulated in precise terms and demonstrated through previous strikes, has established a new reality: any attack on Iranian energy infrastructure will be met with a response that targets not only Israel’s power grid but the economic foundations of American hegemonic power across the Persian Gulf.

The threat is not theoretical, as experts warn. The targets are identified, the systems are in place, and the only remaining question is whether Washington will go up the escalation ladder.

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