US President Donald Trump announced on November 3, 2026, the morning of the US midterm elections, that Washington would end its approximately $4 billion in annual military assistance to Israel by the end of the year.
Trump argued that the Tel Aviv regime no longer needs the funding, but his remarks also exposed the political considerations behind the decision.
He complained that the annual payment had become an easy target for critics of US support for the Israeli regime amid the ongoing genocidal war on Gaza.
“The left uses the $4 billion payment that everybody knows about, it is no secret, as a signal of unfairness, and we cannot allow that to happen,” Trump said, referring to criticism from Democratic candidates.
The announcement came despite a 10-year memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in 2016, under which Washington committed to providing Israel with $38 billion in military assistance between 2019 and 2028. The package comprises $33 billion in military financing and $5 billion for missile-defence programmes.
However, Trump made no mention of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes provisions that deepen US-Israeli military technology and intelligence integration, expanding bilateral cooperation through channels beyond direct military assistance.
The NDAA is an annual law that sets US defence policy and authorizes Pentagon programmes. Its House version includes Section 219, which proposes a so-called “US-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” while the Senate version contains a corresponding provision under Section 1217.
How would the 2027 NDAA expand US-Israeli military integration?
Section 219 of the House version of the 2027 NDAA proposes a new initiative to expand military technology cooperation between the United States and Israel, covering joint research, development, testing and production.
Under the proposal, the US war secretary would appoint an official to coordinate these activities and identify technologies developed jointly or by Israeli companies that could be used in US military systems and programmes.
The initiative would also support research projects involving military agencies, private companies and universities, while encouraging partnerships between US manufacturers and Israeli companies.
It would cover several fields, including missile and air defense, counter-drone technology, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, advanced sensors, cyber military and electronic warfare.
Other areas listed in the proposal include biotechnology, military communications, data networks and technologies designed to help US armed forces operate when their supply lines and communications are under threat.
The measure would also create ways to move research projects into actual military use through Pentagon procurement programmes, licensing agreements, joint ventures and manufacturing partnerships based in the United States.
This could allow Israeli-developed technologies to become an integral part of US military programmes while giving Israeli companies greater access to US research, production facilities and military contracts.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the NDAA includes a similar proposal under Section 1217, titled the United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act.
What are the intelligence-sharing and security concerns?
Alongside the military technology proposals, the 2027 NDAA includes a separate provision, Section 618, that seeks to expand intelligence cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv.
The provision would require the US president, through the director of national intelligence and, when necessary, the war secretary, to increase intelligence sharing with the Israelis and expand cooperation with its spy agencies.
The information covered would include intelligence on cybersecurity, missile programmes, drones, military activities and the plans of state and non-state actors, as well as information on threats to US forces and regional partners.
The proposal would also limit the president's ability to reduce or suspend intelligence sharing with the Israelis.
It allows such a decision only when there is a specific national security concern, such as a risk to intelligence sources or counterintelligence operations.
Any decision to change the level of intelligence cooperation would have to be documented and reported to congressional intelligence committees, including the reasons for the change and its expected impact on regional security.
Observers have strongly condemned this section, arguing that these restrictions could make it significantly hard for a US president to protect sensitive information or respond to security risks, even when intelligence agencies identify concerns about sharing information with the Israelis.
They have also warned that the three measures together could make the relationship more difficult for future administrations to change.
Who is trying to block the provisions, and when will Congress vote?
Opposition to the proposed measures has grown ahead of negotiations on the final 2027 NDAA, with Democratic lawmakers seeking to remove the provisions before the current Congress ends in January.
On November 10, Senator Christopher Van Hollen led a group of 12 senators in urging congressional leaders to remove Sections 219, 1217 and 618, arguing that they could restrict Washington's ability to make independent national security decisions.
The letter was also signed by Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Patricia Murray, Ronald Wyden, Jeffrey Merkley, Brian Schatz, Edward Markey, Tammy Duckworth, Tina Smith, Peter Welch and Andrew Kim.
In the House, Congressman Rohit Khanna has urged Democrats to make removing Section 219 a priority during the post-election session, while Republican Congressman Thomas Massie has also tried to strike the provision from the defense bill.
Their earlier amendment was not allowed a separate floor vote, and the House passed its version of the NDAA on July 22 with Section 219 still included, by a narrow vote of 216 to 212.
However, supporters of the initiative, including lawmakers who backed the United States-Israel FUTURES Act, are seeking to retain the provisions as House and Senate negotiators work on the final bill.
Among the supporters are House Armed Services Committee Chairman Michael Rogers and Senator Theodore Budd, who have backed closer military technology cooperation with the Israelis.
The negotiations are taking place during the lame-duck session, the period between the November elections and the start of the new Congress on January 3, 2027, when Republicans still control both chambers.
If lawmakers fail to agree on a final bill before the current Congress ends, the legislation would have to be taken up again by the incoming Congress, where Democrats will hold majorities in both chambers.
How could deeper military integration put US interests at risk?
The proposed framework could leave the United States increasingly dependent on the Israeli military industry, greatly weakening Washington's ability to control its own military technology and security commitments.
By incorporating Israeli-developed technologies into American weapons systems, the Pentagon could become dependent on Israeli companies for critical components, software and production, making it harder and more costly to end joint projects.
The intelligence-sharing provision could pose an even greater risk by restricting the president's ability to suspend cooperation, potentially exposing sensitive American intelligence, sources and military operations.
Meanwhile, replacing direct aid with joint projects and defense contracts could make American support less visible and harder for Congress and the public to scrutinize.
In the long term, Washington could find itself financing and protecting a military partnership that it has no freedom to control, while bearing the financial and security costs of decisions made by the Israelis.

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