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Iran, Russia and the GECF battle against US energy colonialism

Major gas producers gather in Moscow on Tuesday, where Russia and Iran seek to mobilize members of the GECF to confront US energy colonialism, strengthen energy sovereignty and protect their collective interests amid escalating geopolitical tensions.

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Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will travel to Moscow on Tuesday to attend the eighth summit of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), at a moment when war and geopolitical confrontation are reshaping the global energy market.

The Ukraine war transformed Russia’s energy relationship with Europe, while the US-Israeli war on Iran has disrupted energy supplies across the Persian Gulf, exposing the vulnerability of energy markets to military aggression and geopolitical coercion.

Meanwhile, the US has emerged as a major beneficiary of this upheaval, expanding its role as a global LNG supplier. Hence, wars must be understood not as isolated regional conflicts but as instruments of a broader struggle over control of global energy.

American policymakers have used military confrontation, economic pressure and the disruption of competing supply systems to advance Washington’s strategic objectives, weaken rival producers and expand the reach of US energy companies.

This is the central mechanism of American energy colonialism using geopolitical power to reshape energy markets in ways that strengthen American commercial and strategic dominance.

The consequences extend far beyond the countries directly involved in these wars.

European consumers have faced prohibitive energy costs following the rupture of established energy relations with Russia, while industries and households across energy-importing economies have borne the burden of price volatility and supply insecurity.

Washington’s pursuit of its objectives carries no exemption for friends. Allies and adversaries alike are expected to operate within an international system in which American strategic and commercial interests take precedence over their economic independence.

The Ukraine war fundamentally altered Europe’s relationship with Russian gas, creating an opening for American liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters to expand their presence in one of the world’s largest energy markets.

The strategic rupture has therefore served not only to weaken Russia’s position in Europe but also to strengthen the role of American suppliers in determining the continent’s energy options.

The war against Iran has brought the same struggle over energy and geopolitical power into the Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important arteries for international energy shipments, has become central to the disruption.

Higher transportation costs, supply disruptions and heightened risk premiums have transmitted the effects of war far beyond the battlefield. In this context, war functions as a means of restructuring the energy market.

By weakening competing producers, disrupting their infrastructure and threatening the routes through which their resources reach customers, the US strengthens the position of American exporters while increasing the dependence of other countries on its supplies.

QatarEnergy’s latest agreements with American LNG producer Cheniere Energy illustrate the scale and long-term implications of this transformation.

Last week, QatarEnergy announced agreements to purchase up to four million tonnes of American LNG annually under long-term arrangements extending towards the middle of the century.

Reuters has also reported advanced negotiations between QatarEnergy and another American producer, Venture Global, for the purchase of at least three million tonnes of LNG annually.

Qatar is one of the world’s leading natural gas exporters, yet its national energy company is committing to substantial purchases from the United States over a period extending decades into the future.

This is the structural advantage Washington seeks to secure. The expansion of American LNG does not depend exclusively on political alignment with importing countries.

It can also advance through circumstances in which war, infrastructure damage and supply insecurity leave governments and energy companies with fewer practical alternatives. The resulting dependence can persist long after the immediate crisis has passed.

The experience of Europe and the Persian Gulf underscores the need for gas-producing countries to examine the consequences of allowing geopolitical confrontation to determine the organization of global energy commerce.

If wars repeatedly weaken established supply systems while American exporters expand their market share, the result will be a more concentrated energy order in which strategic and commercial power is increasingly exercised from Washington.

The eighth GECF summit in Moscow provides an opportunity to confront this imbalance.

Its twelve full members—Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela—collectively hold approximately 70 percent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves.

Its members also account for approximately 38 percent of global marketed gas production, 42 percent of international gas exports and around 47 percent of LNG exports.

The task in Moscow, therefore, is to turn that institutional capacity into a coordinated response to the growing use of energy dependence as an instrument of power.

Iran and Russia have both the resource base and the strategic incentives to play a leading role in this effort.

Their enormous natural gas reserves which are the world’s first and second total, established energy industries and geographical reach provide the foundation for cooperation extending beyond bilateral trade.

Their comprehensive strategic partnership also offers a framework for pursuing joint projects across energy and other strategic sectors.

Russia possesses extensive production capacity and experience supplying major international markets.

Iran occupies a strategic position connecting the Persian Gulf, the Caspian basin, the Caucasus and Central Asia, with access to neighboring markets extending towards Turkey and Iraq.

Its location gives it significance beyond its own production capacity where Iran can serve as a connecting point between energy-producing regions and the markets that depend on them.

Existing gas connections with Turkey, Armenia and Iraq, alongside exchanges involving Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, demonstrate the country's role in regional energy networks.

These connections offer a foundation for developing more flexible arrangements for gas exchanges and cross-border supply.

Iranian and Russian officials have already discussed gas transfers, joint field development and broader energy cooperation.

Hamid Bovard, caretaker minister of petroleum, said that the broad agreements concerning the transfer of Russian gas to Iran have been reached and that technical work is under way.

He described the agreement as nearly finalized, following discussions between the two countries’ presidents on the sidelines of an international summit in Turkmenistan.

Bovard said Russian experts have examined the proposed transit route through Azerbaijani territory and expressed hope that gas transfers along this route could begin soon.

Expanding these connections would increase the range of options available to producers and consumers while helping to reduce the strategic vulnerability created by dependence on limited transportation corridors.

The choice confronting the world's gas producers is whether to remain exposed to a system in which geopolitical confrontation repeatedly weakens competing suppliers while American commercial influence expands, or to organize their collective resources in defense of their own interests.

For Iran and Russia, leadership in this effort is a matter of ensuring that the countries possessing the world's major energy resources have a decisive voice in how those resources shape the global economy.