By Press TV Strategic Analysis Desk

If reports are to be believed, the United States and the Israeli regime are mulling another bout of military adventurism against the Islamic Republic of Iran following two failed attempts in less than a year.

Both unprovoked and illegal wars of aggression were launched amid indirect nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington, both hostile acts violated commitments that Washington had made, and neither achieved its objective of forcing Tehran into submission.

Instead, the foolhardy military adventurism left the aggressors mired in a strategic quagmire of their own making, the pain of which is now felt by governments across the world amid rising costs and widening protests.

With both regimes in Tel Aviv and Washington at the cusp of important elections, the rhetoric of renewed military aggression against Iran has returned with familiar intensity.

Yet so has something more consequential: Iran’s definitive decision to respond forcefully to any fresh attack without restraint. The US-Israeli war machine is confronting a country that cannot simply be bombed or sanctioned without consequences for the aggressors.

A definitive decision

Last week, a senior security official told Press TV that Iran has prepared for an all-out and multilayered war. The choice of words was interesting. Iran, the official said, has made a “definitive decision” to respond to any enemy aggression, killing, or assassination “without any limits or restraint.”

The Iranian armed forces are fully prepared “to smash with full force the interests and targets within reach of the aggressors and their supporters in the region,” the source said.

It is the language of a country that, after two unprovoked military aggressions, repeated violations of signed agreements, and decades of crippling sanctions, sabotage, and assassination, has come to regard restraint without reciprocal guarantees as a liability.

The message is that any renewed hostile act will invite a response that will extend to the interests and objectives of the two main adversaries and their regional supporters.

Iran is no longer signaling merely that it will defend itself. It is warning that the scope of its response will not be dictated by the scale of aggression. The response will carry a surprise element for the enemy.

The official was equally blunt about the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. The United States, he asserted, would not attack Iran without the Israeli regime, nor would the regime launch an attack without American backing. The notion that either could wage war against Iran independently is “a bitter joke.”

This is more than an observation about military coordination. It reflects Tehran’s assessment that the American-Israeli war machinery operates as an integrated whole. Iran’s response, accordingly, would not be confined to the immediate actor responsible for any hostile act. It would encompass the broader network of interests and objectives supporting the aggression and its enablers.

The official further noted that explicit threats from American officials and the Israeli regime had provided Iran with the legal and moral grounds to take necessary defensive measures. The legal distinction matters. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs.

That implies that repeated threats warrant heightened defensive readiness and that Iran reserves the right to respond to any act of aggression in self-defense.

Iran ready for any scenario, but still keeps diplomacy open: FM spokesman

Iran says it remains ready for any scenario while keeping the window of diplomacy open.

The geometry of the trap

The two imposed wars in June last year and February this year reveal a pattern that is becoming increasingly difficult for Washington to explain away.

In June last year, the Israeli regime, backed by the US, launched military aggression against Iran while negotiations were underway. On February 28 this year, they did so together, in a campaign that continued until April 7. In both cases, diplomatic channels were open when the attacks were launched. In both, Washington violated commitments it had previously made.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made the point in an interview with an Iraqi news channel last week. “We entered into three rounds of negotiations with the American side, and all three previous rounds ultimately led to war against us,” he noted.

The significance lies not simply in the number of failed negotiations but in the pattern they have established. Tehran has repeatedly entered diplomatic engagements in good faith and political will only to see them followed by military aggression. As Araghchi noted, “there is no trust in the American approach.”

This is not intransigence for its own sake but a conclusion drawn from bitter experiences. Multiple rounds of failed negotiations have reinforced the belief that Washington’s commitments cannot be taken at face value.

That history has placed Washington in a strategic bind. Two military aggressions in less than a year failed to bring about Iran’s capitulation as the enemy had calculated. And the diplomatic deadlock now carries an additional cost – the unresolved terms of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in June, which has been repeatedly violated by the American side.

Under the 14-point memorandum, Washington committed to ending the war on all fronts and lifting its illegal blockade and sanctions in exchange for Iran’s gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran brought the strategic waterway under its firm control after the unprovoked and unjustified US-Israeli aggression in late February and has retained that leverage. It has made clear that the strait’s reopening cannot be separated from the implementation of the agreement.

Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf put it very succinctly: “It was the United States that, with miscalculations and a war against Iran, got stuck in the quagmire, and now it is they who must take the necessary steps to get out.”

Qalibaf stated that Trump’s failure to honor the Islamabad memorandum has only compounded Iran’s longstanding mistrust of Washington. The political consequences are significant.

An agreement intended to provide a path out of war has instead become another source of contention, reinforcing Tehran’s belief that American commitments carry little weight.

The result is a strategic impasse of Washington’s own making. Military aggression and economic terrorism have failed to secure the desired outcome. Iran, meanwhile, retains leverage over a waterway whose reopening is central to any durable settlement.

The seven conditions and the nuclear red line

Iran’s conditions for a permanent ceasefire have been conveyed to Washington through Pakistani and Qatari mediators. Last month, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran had submitted seven conditions and was awaiting Trump’s response.

“Our conditions are an end to the war on all fronts, the release of our frozen funds, and an end to the naval blockade,” Rezaei said. He subsequently described Washington’s response as “insufficient.”

In a post on X, Rezaei drew an unequivocal line on the nuclear issue, rejecting the unreasonable US demand that enriched uranium be transferred out of the country: “Not a single gram of enriched uranium will be removed from Iran.”

He reiterated the position during a meeting in Tehran with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Asim Munir, who conveyed the US demand to the Iranian side. “All enriched nuclear material will remain in Iran, and not a single particle will leave the country. This material is a great asset and national wealth for the Iranian people to use domestically,” he said.

The message leaves little room for ambiguity. Tehran regards its enriched uranium as a strategic and national asset and rejects its removal from the country as a condition for ending the war that was illegally imposed on the country. Repeated US demands on the issue have met with equally categorical refusals.

For Iran, the nuclear issue also extends beyond the technical questions surrounding enrichment and stockpiles. FM Araghchi has noted that the underlying issue concerns the political orientation of the Islamic Republic itself. “What they oppose and refuse to accept is the thinking underpinning Iran’s establishment and the Iranian mindset.”

That assessment reflects Tehran’s conviction that its peaceful nuclear program has become an instrument in a wider struggle over sovereignty and strategic independence. So, even concessions on the nuclear file would not necessarily resolve the issue since Washington’s broader objective is to contain Iran’s regional role and political autonomy.

Tehran’s refusal to surrender its enriched uranium is both a negotiating position and a declaration of a non-negotiable national interest, which is rightly a red line.

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The diplomatic track and the military track

Iran has not abandoned diplomacy despite all sorts of provocations. Araghchi recently outlined a Seven-Day Plan for a conditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, proposing a sequence in which Washington first fulfills its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum, followed by an understanding on the strategic waterway, its reopening under agreed arrangements, and further negotiations toward a final agreement.

The plan, he said, was proposed “in order to prevent diplomacy from collapsing altogether.”

Tehran has also been working with Oman on designated maritime routes through the strait. The routes have been mapped and their geographical coordinates have been established. They would then need to be registered with the International Maritime Organization and submitted for its consideration.

This shows Iran is preparing the practical arrangements necessary for a possible reopening. But it also underscores the conditions attached to that prospect. Washington must first demonstrate that it is willing to implement the commitments it has already made – with the necessary guarantees.

The distinction here is crucial. Iran’s diplomatic track remains open, but it is not unconditional. Tehran is offering a process, not a unilateral concession. The sequencing of the proposed plan is designed to prevent another round of negotiations from reproducing the same cycle of promises, delays, and escalation.

Araghchi has been equally explicit about the military alternative: “I reiterate that we are just as prepared for diplomacy as we are for war.”

This is the dual-track strategy that Washington and Tel Aviv have repeatedly failed to understand. Iranian military preparedness is interpreted as a sign of aggression, while its willingness to negotiate is often treated as evidence that sustained pressure might force further concessions. Both readings overlook the logic underpinning Tehran’s position.

For Iran, military readiness is intended to deter another act of aggression and ensure that any such adventurism carries substantial costs. Diplomacy, meanwhile, offers a way out, but only if the other side honors its commitments.

The two tracks are complementary, not contradictory. Iran’s military posture strengthens its negotiating position, while diplomacy offers Washington an opportunity to avoid another costly escalation. Tehran’s message is that it will neither abandon its defenses to facilitate negotiations nor reject a settlement that protects its interests.

The obstacle is Washington’s record of failing to translate diplomatic commitments into action. Until that changes, the military track will remain central to Tehran’s calculations.

Elections, political pressure, and the risk of escalation

The upcoming elections in the United States and the Israeli regime provide an important context for the renewed rhetoric of aggression. Domestic political pressures can narrow room for maneuver, encourage displays of toughness, and make external confrontation appear politically expedient.

Israeli regime premier Benjamin Netanyahu faces a closely contested electoral landscape, with polling indicating that he is behind the Gadi Eisenkot-led bloc. Trump, too, faces mounting political pressures at home as Democrats are tipped to take back control of Congress. For both leaders, a crisis centered on Iran could offer an opportunity to rally supporters, redirect attention from domestic difficulties, or justify actions that might otherwise be politically costly.

For Washington and Tel Aviv, the danger is that political calculations could once again collide with strategic realities. The previous military campaigns failed to force Iran to abandon its core positions. A renewed aggression would therefore risk reproducing the very conditions that helped produce the current impasse.

The Islamabad memorandum remains central to that impasse. Signed by the Iranian and American presidents in June, its 14 points set out a framework under which Washington would end the war on all fronts and lift its blockade and sanctions in return for Tehran’s gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

As Araghchi said recently, the whole world must understand that it is the American side, not Iran, that is blocking the way. Iranian security officials and military commanders have also repeatedly warned that renewed aggression would place American interests across the region at greater risk.

Qalibaf, dismissing US and Israeli threats to resume war, has insisted that Tehran will not abandon its conditions for ending the war and is prepared to mount a formidable defense.

“We are not warmongers, but we are fully prepared to defend our homeland and our national dignity; threats and military moves cannot influence the strategic decisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said.

The warning is directed at more than the immediate military consequences of another attack. It challenges the assumption that external pressure will force Tehran to revise its strategic positions. If anything, the experience of the past two imposed wars has reinforced Iran’s determination to resist demands it regards as incompatible with its sovereignty.

Hence, the upcoming elections in the US and the occupied territories have understandably intensified the war rhetoric. They will not, however, eliminate the underlying strategic reality. Neither military threats nor diplomatic pressure have secured the concessions Washington and Tel Aviv have sought.

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Qalibaf says Iran is prepared to meet any violation of its territorial integrity with a response beyond its adversaries’ imagination.

The final verdict

The Islamic Republic has made its decision and position clear, and it will not back away. It says it will respond decisively to any renewed aggression, without limits or restraint, and extend its response to the interests and objectives of the aggressors and their regional supporters. The enemy must take it seriously.

It will also not surrender its enriched uranium, abandon its stated conditions for a permanent ceasefire, or accept negotiations that leave its core security interests exposed. This has also been conveyed to the American side.

The two failed military aggressions have not diminished or dampened Iran’s resolve. They have only strengthened it. Each war reinforced Tehran’s belief and conviction that military pressure cannot compel capitulation and that diplomatic assurances, without implementation, cannot rebuild trust.

For Washington and Tel Aviv, the danger lies in mistaking Iran’s willingness to negotiate for an absence of resolve – or its military preparedness for an intention to initiate war. As Qalibaf has repeatedly stated, Iran is ready for both diplomacy and war, and even diplomacy is a form of war from the Iranian perspective.

So, it is not simply a contest of military capabilities but also a test of political judgment, strategic endurance, and the ability to recognize the limits of coercion. Washington and Tel Aviv may still possess formidable military power, but that power has not translated into the political or military outcome they sought because they are confronting Iran.

Iran, for its part, has left open a diplomatic route out of the crisis, conditional on the fulfillment of existing commitments. It has also made clear that it is preparing for the alternative. Whether that dual-track strategy leads to a negotiated settlement or another round of war will depend heavily on the choices made in Washington.

Iran will not trade its sovereignty for a temporary reprieve from military pressure. Diplomacy remains possible, but submission is not on the table. The decision to resist and respond to any aggression has been made. What remains undecided is whether Washington and Tel Aviv will recognize the strategic limits of coercion and threats.