Tehran has warned Washington that any renewed aggression will trigger a far more painful response as the US approaches its midterm elections and Israel prepares to vote next week.
The previous rounds of US-Israeli aggression failed to achieve stated objectives, sanctions have failed to force Tehran to accept Washington's terms, and the Strait of Hormuz remains, at the very least, severely disrupted.
Meanwhile, the Saudi war on Yemen threatens another vital maritime corridor, the Bab al-Mandab.
With energy prices rising and political pressure mounting on Donald Trump, is Washington preparing for another escalation or is Tehran's growing leverage forcing America to reconsider its actions?
This article is based on an episode of the Press TV show, Spotlight, featuring Themis Tzimas, Assistant Professor of International law at the University of Nicosia., as well as Syed Muaz Shah, International Law Expert & Geopolitical Analyst from Karachi, Pakistan.
The IRGC has just said that Iran's military capabilities have advanced considerably since the last war and warns that any renewed aggression will be met with a much more painful response.
In your opinion, Mr. Muaz Shah, what sort of capabilities are we going to see in the next war? Do you agree that it is imminent in the very near future?
“So I just would like to reiterate the fact that the IRGC's statement reflects the position that the Islamic Republic is at but has reserved its power and potential to avoid escalation; that Iran is in a position to do something more but has decided not to do it. And the reason for that primarily is to avoid, you know, escalation to a level that cannot be de-escalated.”
“And I think that's something that a lot of the people in the world are witnessing, that the United States has used its full might, full strike force capability, and has not been able to collapse the Iranian government or dissolve the resolve of the Iranian people.”
“And that is something that actually, you know, Iran has demonstrated with only a certain utilization of the resources available to it.”
“The other resources that are available, and have not been exhausted yet, is demonstrative of what is further its capability [sic].”
“So with the opposition exhausting what it has, its military resources, the missile stockpile that everybody has been reporting on, here we have a resolute Iran standing still and steady.”
Syed Muaz Shah, International Law Expert & Geopolitical Analyst
Professor Tzimas, in your opinion, is there going to be another round of aggression against Iran? If so, what sort of a war are we going to witness? The same air campaign that we witnessed in the past, the previous two wars, or is it going to be something different?
“As I see it, it is almost certain that we will have renewed military confrontation.”
“Don't forget, and this is very important, that the war has not ended, even the temporary ceasefire, the Islamabad MOU, has collapsed.”
“It collapsed a few days, a few weeks after it was signed. We're just having a pause in hostilities and I'm not certain if we had any such incidents as of today, from what I've been hearing in the news.”
“In any case, I think that it is almost certain that there will be renewed hostilities.”
“Now, probably what the US will do with Israel, as it seems, it will be that they will try to bomb the Kharg Island.”
“And President Trump will do that in order to go out in [sic] the US public and say, look, we've destroyed Iranian oil facilities and therefore they will capitulate. And that's probably what he's hoping for.”
“Once this happens, and if it is proven that this will be the case, then according to Iranian plans, as I can understand them at least, we will have a significant response, a very painful response, against the [Persian] Gulf allies.”
“Are they still allies of the US? We'll see.”
“But in any case, the [Persian] Gulf allies of the US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, will most likely see some damage, if not complete destruction, of the undersea cables, which are crucial for internet connection and for global economy.”
“And I can imagine some devastating strikes against Israel. So we will have most likely a new round of escalation.”
“Now, President Trump wants to make Iran capitulate and accept regime change and territorial disintegration. This is the plan.”
“I cannot see how the US military will find targets that it didn't strike before that will make Iran capitulate and surrender to the United States.”
“Once, therefore, this new round of military confrontation has failed on behalf of the US, there will be a few questions to be answered.”
“First of all, whether the United States and Israel will provide some type of significant military aid to the [Persian] Gulf allies; until now, they haven't done so, and whether Saudi Arabia will be proven the weak link in the regional architecture of Israeli and US security; and it is very much likely that it will be proven the weak link.”
“Another question is whether the US will be tempted, despite all the denials, what President Trump says has no credibility in any case, whether it will be tempted to use some type of limited nuclear strike.”
“And if this is the case, what will be the Iranian response? Will Iran change its nuclear doctrine in terms of building nuclear weapons?”
“And of course, if the United States will try to get some impressions by launching possibly a ground invasion or an amphibious assault on the Kharg Island, which according to most estimates, will be significant losses if not complete destruction for the U.S. Army.”
“I sense that we are beyond the boundaries of diplomacy at this point. Hopefully something will change and we will have, we may have, you know, a very fascinating surprise in terms of a just peace, but I don't think that this is the most likely outcome.”
“The most likely development, not to say outcome, the most likely development at this point, I think, is renewed confrontation. And it is very obvious that both President Trump and Netanyahu are planning for that.”
Themis Tzimas, Assistant Professor of International law at the University of Nicosia
Mr. Muaz Shah, we have the US midterm elections right around the corner on November 3. Israelis are going to vote on October 27. Let's talk about the effects that these two rounds of elections are going to have on the calculations of both Netanyahu and Donald Trump.
“Oh, that's a very important point, absolutely. The midterm elections in the United States is [sic] very central to the discussion with [sic] the conflict with Iran.”
“The United States, of course, has been kind of edging on doing some action, possibly, and this goes to show you that the United States, if it is wanting to attack before the midterms to raise some sort of, you know, pompous opinion of the Republican side in particular through Trump's actions, may mean that they only have a few days and they want to have that, for lack of a better term, “shock and awe” within the last two or three days when the midterm is going to be due.”
“But, you know, another thing you have to understand, in the United States, domestically, there's been a lot of early election voting that has never happened before.”
“So this is an ongoing thing. It's not like November, first week of November, you're going to have all day of voting happen and the results. There's already early polling.”
“And according to some reports, it's the most early [sic] polling of voting in the history of the United States because of the active efforts to try to politically hamper Trump, particularly in Congress, by the Democrats.”
“So this is still a pressing concern. And we're seeing a lot of wild strategies in the Trump camp.”
“Everybody has heard about the $5,000 that Trump has promised. Along with that, you had even Mike Rogers' wife was passing out money to people at gas stations. I mean, this is like a level of corruption you used to hear (about) a few decades ago.”
“America used to kind of poke fun at non-European nations and their elections. And the fact of the matter that America is doing something so blatantly itself clearly questions what democratic principles they have gotten left.”
“And that's why I feel that if a war is to break out before the midterm, the sole purpose of that is to maybe delay the election, suspend the elections due to emergency measures in which Trump feels they're going to lose, and so he wants to suspend them, or possibly a one, two-day shock and awe, because they don't have the capability to sustain a long shock and awe for more than a day or two, as we've seen at the beginning of the war.”
“As I was saying earlier, the missile stockpile has to rejuvenate, and it isn't at that same level where they're pulling missile batteries from Taiwan and the Chinese front. That’s also concerning to other military strategists in the West.”
“So I think the midterm is an important point. But how is it important? It depends on how Trump wakes up in the morning. And that's how we've been looking at it, is that Trump all of a sudden one day says this, another says that, and the market's been reacting to that.”
“I really feel that this is something that we've always seen from America, and America's always been, you can say, unpredictable.”
“Whereas Iran, on the other side, its response has been measured, its response has been tactical, its response has been leveraged with the resources that it has.”
“So I think Iran is going to be better prepared for any scenario coming forth. And let me just end with this note. A lot of the technology that we know that Iran has, I mean, there's technology that countries don't talk about, but there's technology, for example, the Fatah-2 or the Qasem Bashir or the Etemad-1 missile systems that haven't even been used yet, right?”
“So when we talk about the statement of the IRGC command, these weapons haven't even been used yet. Or the famous anti-ship Abu Mahdi missile has not been used yet. And these are things that are proven that already exist on the record in the arsenal.”
“So we know that Iran's capability, just in technological terms, is much greater than we have witnessed.”
“So is it prepared for the next round? I think more than well prepared, and like I said, the next round won't be that long anyway.”
Syed Muaz Shah, International Law Expert & Geopolitical Analyst
Professor Themis Tzimas, would you agree with Mr. Shah's analysis that the next round of confrontation will not be long?
Would you say after the 12-day war, the 40-day war, and so many of the events in the region in the past eight months, Donald Trump and Netanyahu are still seeing eye-to-eye regarding Iran?
“For them, and for their calculations, Iran is more of a threat now than it was before, because it is obviously in a stronger position. “
“And don't forget that shortly before the war of 2025, Syria had fallen, so supposedly the resistance front by then should have disintegrated.”
“On the contrary, we're currently seeing that not only Iran is stronger, but Hezbollah holds its position, Gaza has not been controlled. And most importantly, Yemen and Ansarullah are stronger than ever.”
“So by the end of 2024, the resistance front should have been over, but it has emerged even stronger. So it's more of a threat for them than it was before, Iran and the resistance front in general.”
“Now, as for the duration of the new potential conflict, it is possible that it may be a quick round.”
“First of all, it will not be the end of the war, the end of the war will come when there will be a clear victory for one of the two parties.”
“The clear victory for the US and Israel is the disintegration of Iran.”
“The clear victory for Iran and the resistance front is the complete ousting of the US from the region, so that they can pose very little threat.”
“Will it be quick? It is likely, but I'm not so sure.”
“In the sense that, yes, the US will try, I agree with your other speaker, the US will try to achieve some kind of blitzkrieg result at the end of the elections, trying to make a favor [sic] both to Trump and to Netanyahu.”
“But if this isn't the case, and if Iran responds as it is expected to respond, with very significant strikes on the US forces in the region, naval or land forces on Israel, or on the weak links in the [Persian] Gulf, then it will be difficult, very difficult for Trump and Netanyahu to step back and say that the mission is accomplished.”
“You know, there is a very simple proof. The war didn't begin for that, but it has become the determinative factor. Nobody can say from the US or from Israel that they have won the war as long as they cannot open the Strait of Hormuz, and the people see that.”
“So it is very much likely that they will begin the new round of confrontation with the goal of a blitzkrieg, but they will be dragged on, I mean, the US and Israel will be dragged into a prolonged conflict, or relatively prolonged conflict.”
“And by the way, this raises, I think, a question to the military leadership and political leadership of Iran.”
“Will Iran wait for the new round of escalation to happen first, and then will respond? Or, given that we're already in the middle of war, will it take preemptive measures against the aggressors? It's a very important question.”
Themis Tzimas, Assistant Professor of International law at the University of Nicosia
Mr. Shah, when considering the factors that may determine the next round of confrontation and how that next round is going to end, and how long it could take, one of the most important considerations is the Strait of Hormuz and who is managing it; also, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and how it has been disrupted, the situation of the Israeli regime, the US economy, the global economy, the strategic reserves, how much of the US weapons stockpile remains, as we have been hearing different reports on the US stockpiles of different missiles.
Also, we can take into account the current situation in Europe where protests are becoming more and more common in different cities in Europe.
“Yes, absolutely. I just want to also highlight here a very important thing, and this goes to show you the responsible stance of the Iranian government. Not only did we get the statement from the IRGC, but we also got from Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that the United States was not willing to talk diplomatically. The doors of negotiation have never been closed by Iran.”
“And I think that shows responsibility in the international plane that someone in a conflict that has been thrust upon it is still willing to negotiate in principle based on amicable terms to both parties, and perhaps going back to the Islamabad MOU and restarting that, what they had started then.”
“And this is an important point I don't think we talk much about.”
“But Iran has always, always had that position, that we've never stopped wanting to talk, but it has to be based on principled grounds.”
“So, if you want to fight, we can fight, too, as long as it's necessary.”
“And as my colleague mentioned, the real issue is the Strait of Hormuz. And that's something that the Americans were unprepared for.”
“Previously I illustrated that the real weapon here is the economic weapon. And the sanctions that the United States have been trying to put on Iran since its revolution of 1979, trying to put a stranglehold on the economy, people will talk about it as a very significant tool.”
“But more significantly, the economic stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz trumps that. And that is what Iran's, I think, economic weapon is greater than the United States' economic weapon. It's more of an economic defense, if you ask me.”
“And I think this is something that the Europeans are seeing as well because of the energy costs. And this is also impacting people in food production.”
“So it's cutting across the board, as Iran is a significant supplier of some of these goods that go into the world market, regardless of the American sanctions.”
“I mean, that's testament to the strength of the Iranian people and its significance to the world economy, that if you prevent its participation fully and do illegal action like we have done, it's going to have consequences that go beyond the two, what people may assume, the two warring parties.”
“And so this is something that I think Iran has been able to kind of elevate the conversation, engage international players into this, and has been responsibly trying to attempt to find a way, trying to thread the needle through the Strait of Hormuz by talking to regional partners, by trying to have these doors open.”
“But Trump, unfortunately, as we see the United States has played around with diplomatic negotiations. When they're at the verge of coming to terms, he goes back and for what reasons? I think they're more personal in his economic gain than they are for the nation's interest.”
“And right now the midterm elections, unfortunately, has called that out, and the cards have been laid on the table. And I think this is something that Trump is having a very difficult time playing and toying with. And I think that violence is something that he's always resorted to, to avoid accountability.”
“And I think that's also why they're putting this pressure on the ICC as well, so, I mean, that's a connected matter that also the Europeans are very frustrated with as well.”
Syed Muaz Shah, International Law Expert & Geopolitical Analyst
When it comes to mediation, Mr Tzimas, some are saying that it's best to let countries like Russia and China mediate a deal between Iran and the US, as they are great powers and best placed to do so. Would you agree with that assessment?
“No. Because Russia has not achieved anything with all its attempts towards the United States to solve the issue in Ukraine, which is much less vital for US interests than Iran is.”
“And China is not very successful either. Look, many people who think that somehow the United States, because of Trump or because of Netanyahu, have been tricked into this war.”
“Obviously, this is an aspect, but this is not the main thing.”
“The United States knows very well their interests, meaning the interests of their elites, which surround the state as well.”
“And their elites need complete control over global oil flows and to disrupt, to destroy the Eurasian project, part of which are China, Iran, Russia and some other states.”
“It's not that the US does not know how to end the war, it’s that they do not want to end the war.”
“It is vital for them to push Iran towards disintegration. And the same is the case with Russia as well, and with China, by the way.”
“They just want to destroy them one after the other, not all of them together.”
“So it's not a matter of mediators, there was a mediator, but still it failed.”
Themis Tzimas, Assistant Professor of International law at the University of Nicosia
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