By Arman Shariati

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) is best known for its world-class ballistic missiles and advanced drone platforms that have demonstrated their worth in the two imposed wars since June last year.

For good reason, it commands a large share of Iran’s offensive strategic and tactical capabilities. Its missile forces, extensive underground launch complexes, and Shahed drone family have become defining features of Iran’s rapidly growing military power.

Air defense, however, is primarily the responsibility of the Iranian Army’s Air Defense Force, which operates long-range systems such as the Bavar-373, S-300PMU-2, and various versions of the Sayyad missile family.

The IRGC-ASF has a more specialized but equally important role: protecting some of Iran’s most sensitive military assets, particularly its missile complexes and underground launch facilities. To carry out this mission, it operates several of the country’s most advanced short- and medium-range air defense systems.

One of the key systems in its inventory is the Nohe-Dey (9-Dey), a short-range surface-to-air missile system associated with the broader Sevom Khordad (3rd Khordad) family.

The latter has emerged as one of Iran’s most operationally successful domestically developed air defense platforms over the past decade.

Origins and unveiling

The 9th Dey missile system was first publicly displayed at the Eqtedar-40 (Might-40) defense exhibition in 2019, held to mark the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.

Its formal unveiling followed in 2021, confirming its role within the Sevom Khordad layered air defense architecture.

The name 9th Dey refers to a date on the Iranian solar calendar associated with a mass show of support for the Islamic Republic in 2009 in the face of hostile external plots. The IRGC frequently uses politically and historically significant dates to name its major military systems.

Technical characteristics: First generation

The initial production version of the Nohe-Dey features two missile variants designed to engage low-altitude, short-range threats that the larger Taer-series missiles used by the Sevom Khordad system are less suited to intercept.

Missile 1.  Inertial and semi-active radar guidance:

• Maximum engagement range: 20 km
• Engagement altitude: 10 km
• Top speed: 1,300 m/s
• Total weight: 250 kg
• Warhead: 50 kg

Missile 2. Command guidance:

• Identical range and speed envelope to Missile 1
• Total weight: 240 kg
• Warhead: 30 kg

Because both Nohe-Dey missile variants are significantly smaller than the Taer-2 and Taer-3 interceptors used by the Sevom Khordad transporter-erector-launcher and radar (TELAR), the original configuration carries eight Nohe-Dey missiles per launcher.

The system is designed to counter cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and aerial glide bombs. It forms the innermost defensive layer of the Sevom Khordad architecture, complementing the longer-range capabilities of the Taer-3, with a range of 200 km, and the Taer-2, with a range of 105 km.

At the battalion level, the original Nohe-Dey configuration provides 96 ready-to-fire missiles and can engage up to 32 targets simultaneously across its batteries, each capable of handling up to eight simultaneous engagements.

This capacity could make it more difficult for an adversary to overwhelm the system with saturation attacks involving cruise missiles, UAVs, and aerial glide munitions.

First operational deployment

During a military exercise in 2023, the Nohe-Dey system made its first recorded operational deployment. Command-guided missiles were used to engage and successfully intercept designated aerial targets. The exercise demonstrated the system’s integration into the Sevom Khordad architecture and provided an opportunity to assess its operational role.

Second generation: Expanded missile family and new TELAR configuration

During a visit by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei to an IRGC Aerospace Force exhibition, a new generation of the Sevom Khordad system was displayed alongside an upgraded Nohe-Dey launcher and a new set of missiles.

The second-generation transporter-erector-launcher and radar (TELAR) departed from the original eight-canister layout, adopting six larger missile canisters instead.

Although this appeared to reduce the number of ready-to-fire missiles, the change points to a broader expansion of the system’s capabilities.

Notably, the canisters’ cross-sectional shape changed from square to rectangular, suggesting a redesign to accommodate larger-diameter or longer missiles, allowing for more advanced guidance systems.

Displayed alongside the updated six-canister TELAR were five distinct missile variants from the Nohe-Dey family, representing a substantial maturation of the system’s capability envelope:

1. Miniaturized short-range variant

The smallest missile in the family, this variant is significantly reduced in both length and diameter. Its dimensions suggest that four missiles could be packed into a single launcher canister.

In addition to possible applications in vertical-launch naval systems, it is optimized for very-short-range, low-altitude engagements against UAVs.

This configuration could substantially increase the number of missiles available to each battery for countering low-cost, modern aerial threats.

2. Imaging infrared (IIR)-guided variant

One of the most significant developments is the introduction of an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker. This guidance system allows the missile to be launched toward a target area before autonomously acquiring and engaging the target during the terminal phase, reducing its reliance on ground-based radar for target tracking.

Such a capability would be particularly valuable in volatile electromagnetic environments, where radar emissions can expose air-defense positions to anti-radiation weapons.

These missiles also feature proximity fuzes, allowing the warhead to detonate when the missile passes sufficiently close to its target. This would disperse fragments in the target's vicinity without requiring a direct impact.

3. Extended guidance-section variant

This variant is distinguished by a noticeably longer guidance and control section than those observed on other missiles in the family, including differences in the apparent placement of its proximity fuzes.

The additional length may indicate a different guidance architecture, potentially incorporating active radar homing, multi-mode guidance, or improved electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).

However, Iran has not publicly confirmed the guidance system or explained the purpose of the revised design, so these possibilities remain speculative.

Operational role: The shield of the missile force

The operational significance of the Nohe-Dey extends beyond its role in conventional air defense. To understand its potential importance, it must be considered in the context of how Iran operates and protects its missile force.

Iran’s IRGC underground launch complexes, often referred to as “missile cities,” are designed to withstand attacks through hardened infrastructure, concealment, and dispersal.

However, mobile launchers may be more exposed when leaving these facilities, moving into firing positions, and preparing to launch. The periods surrounding deployment and launch can therefore present critical vulnerabilities. This is where short-range systems such as the Nohe-Dey provides a final layer of protection for mobile launchers during their operational window.

Iranian underground facilities incorporate air-defense systems intended to protect launchers as they emerge from or return to underground positions. With its high missile capacity and emphasis on countering UAVs, cruise missiles, and glide bombs, the Nohe-Dey is suited to a close-range defensive role.

Deployed around launcher operating areas, it establishes a protective perimeter against aerial threats during the launch cycle. The extent to which the system is deployed in this role, however, has not been independently established.

Combat record: The 12-day war and the 40-day war

The 12-day imposed war in June last year and the subsequent 40-day imposed war launched in February this year placed Iran’s air-defense architecture under severe operational pressure.

Israeli and American air aggression involved advanced aircraft, long-range strike packages, precision-guided munitions, and efforts to suppress or destroy Iranian air defenses (SEAD/DEAD). Together, these capabilities presented a formidable challenge to Iran’s ability to protect its military infrastructure and maintain missile operations.

Iran continued launching missiles at adversary targets during periods of sustained aerial pressure. This demonstrates that the country’s missile force retained its operational capacity despite the enemy’s aggression, although continued launches alone do not establish how effective Iran’s air-defense network was or how much protection individual systems provided.

Assessing that effectiveness requires evidence about launcher survivability, damage to facilities, launch rates, and the ability of opposing forces to locate and strike mobile assets.

Nohe-Dey’s contribution to protecting Iran’s missile force can be examined through several lenses:

ISR asset attrition: Many Israeli and American unmanned aircraft were shot down during the two imposed wars, demonstrating the efficacy of Iranian short-range air-defense systems in protecting the country’s missile infrastructure.

UAVs used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and target designation fall within the Nohe-Dey’s intended engagement envelope, depending on their altitude, speed, and operating profile.

Debris evidence: The recovery of Nohe-Dey missile debris in the vicinity of downed enemy UAV crash sites provides forensic support for the hypothesis that the system was actively employed in these engagements.

Passive guidance under SEAD conditions: Given the intensity of anti-radiation missile and SEAD operations conducted by Israeli and American forces throughout both wars, the passive IIR guidance capability of the newer Nohe-Dey variants, if they had entered service by this point, would have carried significant operational value.

A system that can engage without emitting radar energy is substantially harder to suppress. The operational logic strongly suggests these variants were deployed, though Iranian authorities have not publicly confirmed their combat use.

Production, Inventory, and Export Potential

Iran does not publish inventory figures. This deliberate security measure applies across its entire military production apparatus. However, open-source evidence provides a reasonable basis for assessment.

Footage from underground storage depots and IRGC Aerospace bases has shown significant quantities of Nohe-Dey missiles in storage configurations, suggesting a mature logistics pipeline rather than a developmental or limited-production program.

Footage from production facilities dated to 2021, cross-referenced with visible registry numbers on missile booster sections, placed production volumes at the time at several hundred units per year.

For an air defense missile, several hundred rounds annually is a meaningful figure, as it implies a real operational stockpile rather than a prestige inventory, and suggests genuine sustained deployment capacity across multiple sites.

Given that the 2021 figure represents a data point now several years in the past, and accounting for likely capacity expansion and wartime production prioritization, current annual production is in all probability higher.

The combination of battle-tested performance, demonstrated production capacity, passive guidance options suited to electronically contested environments, and VLS compatibility gives the Nohe-Dey genuine export potential.

Iran has marketed the system at international defense exhibitions, and its post-war status as a system that contributed to one of the most difficult air defense environments of recent years will not go unnoticed by potential customers operating in similar threat environments.

Advantage Iran

The Nohe-Dey occupies a specific and well-defined niche in the Iranian air defense order of battle. It is not a prestige system or a long-range showpiece. It is a purpose-built close-in defense tool, designed for the exact operational scenario Iran faced during the most intense air aggression against its territory in the country's modern history.

Its design evolution, from a dual-variant eight-missile configuration to a five-variant family with passive IIR guidance and naval VLS compatibility, shows a program that has adapted to real operational feedback rather than one frozen in its initial specification.

The transition toward passive guidance is the single most analytically significant development, as it reflects a doctrinal acknowledgment that future wars will involve heavy SEAD operations, and that purely radar-dependent air defense in that environment carries survivability costs that passive seekers can mitigate.

The broader conclusion is straightforward. Iran’s missile force survived two imposed wars against adversaries with the most capable SEAD packages in the world.

That survival was not accidental. It was the product of dispersal, hardening, operational security, and layers of close-in air defense, of which the Nohe-Dey, for the most sensitive nodes in the network, was likely the innermost and final layer.